The F1 Abu Dhabi GP 2025: A Perfect Day for the Race Direction
Abstract
The 2025 Abu Dhabi Grand Prix produced an incident
capable of influencing the entire championship outcome. Yet, Race Control and
the Stewards delivered a set of decisions that aligned perfectly with the
International Sporting Code and the FIA Sporting Regulations. This analysis
retraces the key moments of the race, focusing on the defensive actions of car
22 against car 4, the regulatory basis behind the verdicts contained in FIA
Documents 46 and 48, and the reasons why the officiating in this case deserves
explicit recognition.
A Necessary Acknowledgement: When
Criticism Meets Accuracy
It is common for the decisions from Race Control and
the stewards to become targets of debate, especially when the rulings involve
title contenders or moments of heightened tension. However, the Abu Dhabi Grand
Prix represents one of those instances where the application of the rules was
not only correct, but exemplary.
The Steward commission made by Garry Connelly, Mathieu
Remmerie, Derek Warwick and Mohammed Al Hashmi applied Appendix L, Chapter IV,
Article 2(b) of the International Sporting Code and Article 33.3 of the FIA
Formula One Sporting Regulations with clarity, internal coherence, and strict
adherence to the evidence, avoiding that pressure and external interference
could alter the decision. Document 46 demonstrates a precise identification of
the infraction committed by car 22, while Document 48 follows the logical
regulatory consequence by establishing that the off-track overtake by car 4 was
induced, not voluntary. The cause–effect sequence was acknowledged and
enforced, exactly as the framework requires.
The Pivotal Episode: The Tsunoda –
Norris Incident
The crucial moment
unfolded on the straight between Turns 5 and 6, where car 22 executed three
distinct changes of direction[1].
The last of these three manoeuvres was the most important.
As you can see from these frames and the official
footage referenced in the footnotes, the third change of direction occurred
when car no. 4 started to overtake. Examining the images, it is possible to
conclude that there was just enough space for Norris to stay on the track, but
this argument lacks pragmatism. In reality, when driving at over 300 km/h, it
is impossible to see such a small amount of space on the track, especially if
the other car is driving erratically in an attempt to avoid being overtaken.
For this reason, it is important to have racing drivers on the steward panel to
evaluate racing situations according to both the rules and real-life scenarios.
FIA’s Documents 46 and 48: an In-Depth
Look to the Decisions
The abovementioned documents fully confirm the
trajectory of events that can briefly be resumed as follows and leaves no
ambiguity regarding the infringement of Article 2(b) of Appendix L.:
– Multiple direction changes;
– Direct creation of a collision risk;
– Car 4 forced off track to avoid contact.
The behaviour of car
22 violates precisely the scenario described in Appendix L, Chapter IV, Article
2(b), but let’s look to the full article to understand better the situation.
“Overtaking,
according to the circumstances, may be carried out on either the right or the
left.
A driver may not
leave the track without justifiable reason.
More than one
change of direction to defend a position is not permitted.
Any driver
moving back towards the racing line, having earlier defended his position
off-line, should leave at least one car width between his own car and the edge
of the track on the approach to the corner.
However,
manoeuvres liable to hinder other drivers, such as deliberate crowding of a car
beyond the edge of the track or any other abnormal change of direction, are
strictly prohibited. Any driver who appears guilty of any of the above offences
will be reported to the Stewards”[2].
In this case, we can see that car no. 22 made three
changes of direction without leaving enough space. This manoeuvre (crowding and
an abnormal change of direction) was liable to hinder other drivers, causing
car no. 4 to leave the track. The same perfect analysis can be seen in doc. no.
46, which states: “Car 4 was making an overtaking move on Car 22. Car 22 made a number of changes of direction
which ultimately resulted in Car 4 having to go off track to avoid a collision.
In doing so, Car 22 also effectively forced Car 4 off the track.”[3]
Continuing by looking at document no.46 (about car no.
4) we can see that the alleged infringement is “Leaving the track and
gaining an advantage”. In this case the steward commission stated that:
“Had Car 22 not made those moves, Car 4 would have
overtaken it without going off track but moved off track to avoid contact with
Car 22. Further, the Driving Standards
Guidelines provide that if a car is “forced off” (which was effectively what
occurred here) it is not considered to have exceeded track limits”[4].
At this point the only consideration needed on
document no.48 is that car. no 4, by doing this manoeuvre is not gained an
advantage but, on the contrary, has lost time by going off the ideal trajectory
and collecting marbles.
The only critic consideration that needs to be made
about these two decisions is related to the penalty combined to car no. 22. As
document 46 states, the steward has used “built on video, in-car footage and
radio transmissions”. Given the clearly intentional nature of the manoeuvre
and the team radio between Tsunoda and the Red Bull’s pit wall (visible in real
time and arguably coordinated), the incident carried an additional layer of
unsporting behaviour. A harsher penalty of 10 seconds, reflecting both the
abnormal movement and the tactical purpose, would have been justifiable within
the same regulatory framework. Meanwhile, it would not have changed the final
outcome; however, it would have signalled the FIA's strong stance against
unsportsmanlike behaviour in motorsport.
Conclusion: A perfect day for the
Race direction
The Stewards listed in the official documents acted
with precision, consistency, and respect for the fundamental principles of the
International Sporting Code. Their decisions prevented the race (and by
extension, the entire championship) from being distorted by an incorrectly
evaluated incident as unfortunately happened during the 2021 Abu Dhabi Grand
Prix.
In a season where officiating has often been
scrutinised, the 2025 F1 Abu Dhabi Grand Prix stands out as an example of
regulatory competence: the rules were applied as written, the evidence was
weighed correctly, and the balance of the championship remained protected from
artificial influence.
[1] To see the full incident: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IdPMHNnvhyY
[2] Art. 2(b), Chapter IV, Appendix L,
FIA International Sporting Code, FIA, 2025.
[4] Document
no.48, F1 Abu Dhabi Grand Prix 2025, FIA.
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